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 
Abstract--The increasing amount of distributed generation 
(DG) in distribution networks (DNs) is giving rise to power 
quality and protection coordination problems. Issues like 
voltage regulation, flicker, harmonics and loss of 
coordination between circuit breaker and fuse need to be 
addressed for integration of DG into DN. This paper 
discusses these issues with a special emphasis on protection 
coordination problems. A typical DN with DG is modeled 
and simulation results for impact of DG on protection 
system coordination are presented and discussed here. Some 
solutions are proposed to cope with these problems. 
 
Index Terms--Distributed generation (DG), microgrid, 
power quality, protection  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The impact of the distributed generation (DG) on power 
quality of a distribution network (DN) depends on 
different factors like the type of DG, its interface with the 
utility system, the size of the DG unit, its intended mode 
of operation and expected output fluctuation, the total 
capacity of the DG relative to the system, size of 
generation relative to the load at the interconnection 
point, and feeder voltage regulation practice [1]. 
Generally, DG installed to provide back up generation 
and on-site power supply improves the power quality of 
the system. But this is not always the case. Issues do arise 
when distributed generators of different types and 
technologies are connected to DN. The main issues 
include voltage regulation, voltage flicker, voltage dips, 
sustained interruptions, harmonics [1-5] and interference 
with existing utility protection setup [6-12].  
This paper presents an overview of the power quality and 
protection issues in case of DNs with DG. Section II 
outlines key power quality problems briefly. In section 
III, important protection issues and conditions in which 
they can arise are presented and discussed with the help 
of a case study of a typical DN with DG as shown in 
Fig.1.  ASPEN OneLiner software is used to simulate 
different fault scenarios to demonstrate and investigate 
these issues. Section IV discusses the results and 
proposes some solutions. Finally, section V concludes the 
findings of the paper. 
 
 
II.  POWER QUALITY ISSUES 
A.  Voltage Regulation 
The voltage regulation problem may arise as a result of 
introduction of DG into DN for any of the following 
reasons: intermittent nature of the wind turbine, fuel cells 
and combined heat and power plants (CHP); interference 
of the synchronous generators (capable of supplying 
active and reactive power) with the utility voltage   
regulating equipment, i.e., with static voltage regulators 
(SVR) and with load tap changers (LTC); use of 
induction generators and inverters (for grid connection) 
that are not suited for voltage regulation as they lack the 
ability to produce reactive power; use of a small DG unit 
(which lacks the ability to regulate the voltage); 
breakdown of a large DG unit (responsible for voltage 
regulation) in case of a fault on the feeder; lack of 
coordination between multiple DG units; frequent 
connection and disconnection of a large number of small 
DG units - working at a constant power factor- from the 
network; reverse power flow that occurs when DG output 
is in excess of downstream feeder load 
B.  Voltage Flicker 
Voltage flicker is caused by fluctuation of energy which 
results from intermittent generation from wind turbines 
and photovoltaic sources, or connection and 
disconnection of induction generators from the network.  
C.  Voltage Dips 
Voltage dips can occur during start up of induction 
generators (as reactive power is consumed during 
magnetization), switching away of generator from 
synchronous speed or due to short circuits. 
D.  Sustained Interruptions 
Not all the DG technologies are able to provide backup 
generation in case of interruptions or breakdown of the 
main system. DG based on an induction generator, or 
with an uncontrollable inverter, or lacking proper storage 
might be unable to operate in island (standalone) mode. 
E.  Harmonics 
Some forms of DG, i.e., photovoltaic (PV) and fuel cells, 
are connected to the power network through power 
electronic converters. The modern converters based on 
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insulated gate bipolar transistors (IGBTs) use pulse width 
modulation (PWM) technique and thus produce fewer 
harmonics than the old generation of thyristor based line 
commutated inverters. DG based on induction and 
synchronous generators change the response of the 
network to the other harmonic sources by changing 
harmonic impedance of the network. Moreover, 
capacitors used for excitation of induction generators can 
cause resonances in the network. 
F.  Voltage Unbalance 
Voltage unbalance can occur as a result of integration of 
a single phase DG, i.e., DG based on PV units, in DN. 
This unbalance becomes noticeable as more and more 
single phase DG units are introduced into DN. 
III.  PROTECTION ISSUES 
 The introduction of DG into DN brings about a change 
in fault current level (FCL) of the network. This change 
in FCL can, in turn, alter device discrimination, reduce 
reach of overcurrent and distance relays, cause 
sympathetic tripping, force unintentional islanding, and 
mal-operation of autoreclosures [6-12]. Depending upon 
the location of the fault with respect to the DG and the 
existing protection equipment, problems like bi-
directionality and change in voltage profile can also arise. 
To ensure selectivity, proper coordination between relays, 
reclosures, fuses and other protective equipment is a 
must. However, this coordination is severely affected 
when DG is connected to a DN.  
Fig. 1 shows a single line diagram of the system that is 
simulated to investigate the impact of DG on DN 
protection. A typical 25kV distribution network (DN) is 
configured down stream of a 69/25 kV substation named 
as main substation (MS). The utility grid upstream of the 
substation is represented by a Thevenin equivalent of 
voltage source and series impedance with short circuit 
level of 637 MVA and X/R ratio of 8 at 69 kV bus. MS is 
equipped with a 69/25 kV, 15 MVA load tap-changing 
transformer, with delta-wye grounded configuration. The 
transformer has a series equivalent impedance of 7.8 % at 
15 MVA base and connects the DN to the 69 kV sub-
transmission system. 
The DN is modeled by two load feeders, named as LF1 
and LF2 in Fig. 1, emanating from the 25 kV bus. The 
system load-10 MW on each feeder- is modeled as 
constant impedance that has no contribution to the fault. 
Two equivalent synchronous generators rated at 18 MVA 
are connected to the 25 kV bus through two 0.66/25 kV, 
18 MVA step up transformers- with delta-wye grounded 
configuration- and through two 25 kV collector feeders 
named as CF1 and CF2 in Fig. 1. 
The positive sequence impedance for 25 kV feeders is 
0.2138+j0.2880  Ω/km and for 69 kV feeder it is 
0.2767+j0.5673 Ω /km. The zero sequence impedance for 
69kV sub-transmission line (Sub-TL) is 0.5509+j1.4514. 
 
 
 Fig. 1.  Single line diagram of a typical distribution network (DN) with 
distributed generation (DG) where Sub-TL stands for sub-transmission 
line, CF and LF represent collector feeder and load feeder respectively. 
 
A distance relay (SEL 321) is installed at bus 1 end of the 
Sub-TL1 to protect against faults at Sub-TL1 and Sub-
TL2 and to provide back up protection for some part of 
DN. An OC fuse rated at 200 ampere (A) is installed on 
high voltage side of transformer T1 to provide protection 
against transformer internal faults and backup for feeder 
faults. The load feeders are equipped with time graded 
overcurrent (OC) and earth fault (EF) relays (i.e. 51/51N) 
and instantaneous OC and EF relays (i.e. 50/50N) for 
protection against phase and ground faults. The collector 
feeders are also protected by OC relays. OC and EF 
relays of load feeders LF1 and LF2 are set at 280 A and 
140 A respectively. OC relays at the both the collector 
feeders are set at 400 A.  
ASPEN OneLiner is used to simulate different faults for 
determining short circuit levels and to investigate their 
impact on protection coordination including reach of 
distance relays. Fig. 2 shows the time-current 
characteristic curve of the fuse installed at high voltage 
side of MS transformer and OC relays installed at load 
feeders. The operating times that are shown on the curve 
are of fuse and OC relays of load feeders in case of a 
three phase to ground (3LG) fault at 90 % of the LF1 
length. 
    
 
 
Fig. 2.  Operating times of OC relay installed at LF1 and fuse located at 
high voltage side of substation transformer for 3LG fault at 90% of LF 1 
length without DG where 1f  is the fast characteristic and 1 is slow 
characteristic OC relay curve.  
A.  Fault Level Modification 
A 3LG fault was applied to find out fault current at 
different points with and without DG connection as 
shown in Table I. It is clear from the table that after 
introduction of DG, fault current has increased by 28.5% 
at bus 2, by 51% at bus 4 and by 22.8% in case of a fault 
at the end of LF1. 
 
TABLE I. FAULT CURRENTS AT DIFFERENT NETWORK BUSES   
WITH AND WITHOUT DG    
B.       Blinding of Protection 
Operation of a feeder OC relay may be disturbed in the 
presence of DG. Although DG increases the fault levels 
but the fault current seen by the feeder OC relay 
decreases due to DG contribution in situations when DG 
is located between the fault point and the feeding station 
as shown in Fig. 3. This can result in delayed tripping of 
the feeder relay or in worst scenario no tripping at all. It 
is clear from the Table II, in case of 3LG fault at 90 % of 
feeder length, OC relay at LF1 operated in 0.23 
seconds(s) when no DG was connected and the same 
relay operated in 0.29 s when only DG2 is connected or 
both DG units are connected.  
 
Fig. 3. Blinding of protection or delayed tripping scenario in case of a 
3LG fault at 90 % of LF1 length with DG2 connection only. 
 
TABLE II. OPERATING TIMES OF PROTECTION DEVICES IN 
CASE OF 3LG FAULT AT 90% OF LF1 LENGTH (N/O stands for no 
operation and DR stands for distance relay) 
C.  Sympathetic Tripping 
Some times a DG can contribute to a fault on a feeder fed 
from the same substation or even to a fault at higher 
voltage levels resulting in unnecessary isolation of a 
healthy feeder or a DG unit. For example, an OC relay at 
CF1 can unnecessarily operate for a high resistive 3LG 
fault at LF1 as a result of infeed to the fault from DG1 
through the substation bus bar as shown in Fig. 4. 
 
Fig. 4.  Sympathetic tripping scenario when relay at CF1 opens for a 
high resistive 3LG fault at 30% of LF 1 length with both DG connected.  
D.  Reduction in Reach of Distance Relay 
Distance relays are set to operate in a specific time for 
any faults occurring within a predefined zone of a 
transmission line or a distribution feeder. Due to presence 
of DG, a distance relay may not operate according to its 
defined zone settings. When a fault occurs downstream of 
the bus where DG is connected to the utility, impedance 
measured by an upstream relay will be higher than the 
real fault impedance (as seen from the relay). This can 
disturb the relay zone settings and can, thus, result either 
in delayed operation or in some cases no operation at all.  
Table III shows the zone settings for the distance relay 
installed at the Sub-TL 1(shown in Fig. 1).It is clear from 
the table that range of zone 2 decreases to 67% when DG 
is connected from 79% when no DG was connected. 
Similarly, reach of zone 3 is reduced to 91% with DG 
from its previous value of 100% when no DG was 
connected. Zone2 underreach is also shown in Fig. 5. 
 
TABLE III. OPERATING ZONES OF DISTANCE RELAY WITH 
AND WITHOUT DG    
 
 
 
Fig. 5.  Distance relay zone settings and effect of DG on Zone 2 reach 
Configuration 
of DN 
                      Operating time (second) 
 
 
 
 W/O DG 
DR 
(Zone 3) 
Fuse  OC    
relay at 
LF1 
OC 
relay at 
CF 1 
OC 
relay at 
CF 2 
N/O 48.32  0.23  N/O  N/O 
With DG 1  N/O  79.85  0.18  0.58  N/O 
With DG 2  N/O  82.09  0.29  N/O  0.59 
With both DGs  N/O  64  0.29  0.89  0.9 
                             Fault current (in  Amperes)                              
Without DG while 3 phase to  
ground fault is at 
With DG while 3 phase to  ground 
fault is at 
Bus 2   Bus 4 
 
End of  
LF1 
Bus 2 
 
Bus 4 
 
End of  
LF1 
1147  1874 967  1605  3826 1252 
Zones Relay 
settings     
(% of 
line 
length) 
         Distance relay operating range     
    3 phase fault      1 phase fault 
w/o 
DG 
with 
DG 
w/o DG  with DG 
Zone  1  40  40 40 39  39 
Zone  2  80  79 67 79  74 
Zone  3  115 100  91 100 100  
IV.  DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
The simulation results clearly show the impact of DG on 
operation of different protective relays. Most of the 
problems that may arise can be solved by use of modern 
microprocessor based multi-function relays with more 
features and readjustment of relay settings. For example, 
replacing simple OC relays with directional relays on 
collector feeders can solve the problem of sympathetic 
tripping. In this case, additional relays would be required 
to provide back up protection to 25kV bus bar. To solve 
the problem of delayed tripping, current setting of the 
relay at LF1 can be lowered. But this needs great care, as 
if the setting is too low, nuisance tripping can occur in 
severe overload conditions. Another solution is to have 
relays with two groups of settings; one group for 
operation without DG and the other group for operation 
with DG. For its working, this scheme requires a 
communication link between the OC relays at LF1 and 
the relays at collector feeders. 
So far as underreaching of distance relay is concerned, 
readjustment of zone settings or addition of an extra zone 
can make the relay to operate in the correct zone. 
However, the distance relay can over reach if the DG 
units are disconnected. Therefore, these conditions should 
be checked to ensure that there is no mis-coordination 
with the adjacent Zone 2. Installation of one 25 kV circuit 
breaker and a multifunction protective relay including 
50/51, 50/51N, 67,67N and other functions can provide 
fast interruption of fault current infeed for transformer 
faults, primary protection for the 25 kV bus bars and 
local backup protection in case of failure of collector 
feeder relays. The preferred location for this circuit 
breaker is LV side of MS transformer. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
The paper investigates power quality and protection 
issues that can arise in case of DNs with DG with the 
help of a case study. By making use of a simulation 
model of a typical DN, different fault scenarios, i.e. with 
and without DG, have been simulated and behaviour of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
an existing protection set up  has  been examined. The 
results show that DG integration can change fault current 
level and, consequently, coordination of protection 
devices. Nuisance tripping of relays can also occur. 
Distance relays can underreach as a result of fault current 
infeed from DG. All these issues should be addressed in 
order to ensure that protection of system remains reliable 
even after introduction of DG. 
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